Pump 8: Gradual Post-Operative Recovery. Expanding on the prior "pump," if we actually performed a surgery that altered Chase's experience of certain tastes, but that his behavior gradually showed a recuperation of those original tastes, what do we say about his memory? Is there an alteration in how he compares his memories, or in how he accesses them? Either would feasibly explain a drift into a regaining of the "same state" of taste, even if the surgery has not been reversed. Not only can the subject of the surgery not reasonably assert one difference over another, neither can a third-person observer, since he can only go by the behavior and contribution of the subject. Now, the qualia have evaded both the testee as much as the tester.

Pump 9: The Experienced Beer Drinker. No one likes the taste of beer on the first sip, but come to like it over time. But then the qualia of the beer, if they are said to change with further drinking, actually changes with the quantity consumed. This challenges beer's qualia (its taste) as being an "intrinsic" property (a property of the beer independent of relation), but poses it instead is an "extrinsic" property (that requires relation to the quantity of beer drunk). However, if this can be generalized to all cases, then there are no intrinsic properties to which qualia (as a term) can provide any insight.

Pump 10: Worldwide Eugenics. A chemical x exists which tastes bitter to 75% of the human population, and so a popular belief of the qualia of this chemical x could be altered by simply performing a vast eugenics project on those who perceive chemical x as bitter. If we do that, though, then collective opinion appears to dictate what we take as "qualia" for chemicals, and our notion of qualia has nothing to do with some intrinsic property of the chemical, itself.

Pump 11 and 12: Cauliflower Cures and Visual Field Inversion Created by Wearing Inverting Spectacles. Recalling Pump 1, Dennett professes to hate cauliflower. But someone may offer Dennett a pill that promises "that after [he] swallows this pill cauliflower will taste exactly the same to [him] as it always has, but [he] will like that taste!" It is possible to do (say the taste of cauliflower triggers parasympathetic responses akin to a eating chocolate cake, though it definitely still tastes like cauliflower). It sounds like we may have retained intrinsic properties like the qualia we have defined. However, any talk of this involves an imagination and philosophical jargon-ing of the very qualia that we aim to characterize, and so begs the question.

Pump 13: The Osprey Cry. This is an analog of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, instead dealing with distinguishing bird calls rather than noting intrinsic feelings.

Wittgenstein puts, "could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? - Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language."1 This definition of private language entails three perspectives. 1. the reference of the vocabulary in that language is just what the speaker himself knows, or the speaker’s direct and private feelings and inner experience;2. such a language can not be used for inter-subjective communication, but only for his personal use; and 3. no one else can understand this language except the language user himself. Hence private language is private in that it can not be understood by anyone else except by the first person “I”. Therefore, private language is the sounds or written symbols that are exclusive in the understanding or understood by the only person who invented.

Pump 14: The Jello Box. In the days of spies, two people who needed to be careful about identifying each other would carry a half of a ripped Jello box, making a forged match incredibly difficult. And we may find an analogy to this with our ostensive (or even more complex forms of) reference. My friend and I may experience the world very differently, which is not contested. Dennett appears to propose that attempting to refer to intrinsic properties is really an effort to narrow down "idiosyncrasies" that some speakers carry along with the uses of terms, idiosyncrasies we could detect without an utterance of qualia.

Pump 15: The Guitar String. Upon plucking a guitar string, we are able to alter the same note in a few ways. If may strike an E string open in two different ways, but we may describe a second as "bottoming out" after we heard the first. But if one the first, we called that note a distinct sound, then we were really mis-ascribing a complex experience with a single term, which could be divided into other terms to refer to the two portions of the same note working together. It would be a mistake, one may imply, to believe that there is something atomic about our use of reference as the distinguishing mark for qualia, but then it leaves us without a valuable explanation of what else we have. Qualia depends on a sense of some sort of references to the atomic quale of all experiences, but trying to gather them from experience itself doesn't help, since our capacity for reference and isolation of referents is conceivable infinite.